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mostcritical
determinants
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in capitalinvestitiveadvantage(Porter,
mentsin responseto variability
in
1992),in that
have
for
cash
is
flow
detrimental
to
the
firm's
they
long-term
implications
in theirgeneration
firms
ofearnings value and should be eliminated,
throughcurrentand futurereturns. throughhedging,to stabilizecapital
Because capital investments
entail
investments
patterns(Froot et al,
of
outflows
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are relatedto firmreturnsand its
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Froma strategicmanrisk
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have greateremployment
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capitalinvestments
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(Noda and Bower,1996; Steensma
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managersmustbe cognizantof the
factorsthat
relevantorganizational
mayassistthemin makingtheirindecisions.In the
vestment
flexibility
discussthethesections
we
following
oreticalbackground,
develophypothand diseses, explainmethodology,
cuss results.We also providefuture
researchdirectionsand managerial
implications.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Risk and Variationin Capital
Investments

Palmerand Wiseman(1999) refer
riskas the uncerto organizational
streamorreof
a
firm's
income
tainty
turns.This formof riskis distinct
or sharefrommanagerial
risk-taking
holder risk (Palmerand Wiseman,
1999). Researchersnote thatvariais criticalforantionin firmreturns
decior within-firm
alyzingfirm-level
sions (Miller and Bromiley,1990;
PalmerandWiseman,
1999).Firmreturnsprovidethe enablingcondibetionsforresourcecommitments
to
in
addition
cause,
servingas
of thecash availablefrom
indicators
they
operationsto fundinvestments,
toborrow.
influence
thefirm's
ability
Theyalso indicate(albeitnoisily)the
returns from prior investments,
with
whichmayin turnbe correlated
the qualityof the firm'scurrentinvestmentopportunities,provided
theyexistwithinthesamearea ofexpertise.Therefore,reductionsin a
firm'sreturnsgenerallyresult in
in relower levels of investments
sources,whereasincreasesin returns
lead to increasedinvestments.
inVariationin capitalinvestments
dicates how much firms have
changed,or varied,theircapitalinvestments
over time in relationto
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their average investmentlevels.
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or (b) varGreatervariability
indicatesgreater iability
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cash
(1993:1630).Firmreturns
whereaslowervariability
of the
represents flowand the overallliquidity
more stable investmentpatterns. firm;consequently,
variation
in capia firmwithgreatervaria- talinvestments
shouldbe affected
Therefore,
by
tionin capitalinvestments
is either
thevariationin firmreturns.
When
more flexiblein its capital invest- returnsare low, firmsmustration
mentspattern,or has been making capitalaccording
totheirlimited
cash
more changesin its capitalinvest- flow,and onlya fewprojects(usually
thosewiththe highestreturns)get
ments,thanis a firmwithlowervariationincapitalinvestments,
whichinfunded. Greater returns provide
dicateseitherinvestment
or
firms
withmoremoneyto investand
stability
or
to
invest.
reducetheneedforcapitalrationing.
inability unwillingness
Bothstrategic
and fimanagement
Therefore,
higherfirmreturnslead
nance literature
to more projectsgettingaccepted
suggestsimilarrationalesfortherelationship
between and funded.In addition,profitability
risk
and
organizational
capitalinvest- increasesthe borrowing
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ments.The behavioraltheoryof the
thefirm.The ability
to takeon more
whilediscussing
theprocesses
of
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debtenablesadditionalinvestments,
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dicatesthatfirm
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to borrow,due
profits.
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are
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are affected
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unstable,investments
due to lowerprofits.
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Therefore
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affect
is found(Greve,2003). Therefore,
if
variation
in capitalinvestments.
firmreturnsdo not matchexpecta1: Organizationalriskis positively
Hypothesis
tions, investmentpatterns are
relatedwithvariationin capitalinvestments.
solution
changeduntila satisfactory
Twocaveatsare in order.First,reis found.Thissuggests
thatvariation
in firmreturnswillpositively
affect actions to adjusted capital investmentsmayoccurwitha timelag as
in capitalinvestments
variation
decitheinterpretation
and reactionprosionsand that,overtime,capitalincess unfoldsin managerialdecision
vestments
willvaryalongwiththevar- theywillbe
iationin firmreturns
making.Becausevariationin capital
investments
are highand
representsthe investhighwhenfirmreturns
ofthefirmovera period
mentprofile
lowwhenfirmreturns
are low.
oftime,decisionlagscanbe captured
financialliteraturehas
Similarly,
In other
are
shownthatcapitalinvestments
bythepatternofvariability.
betweenvariasensitiveto cash flow (Bond and
words,theassociation
tionin firmreturns
in
and variation
1994;Fazzarietal, 1988)and
Meghir,
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not
investments
a
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and
capital
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liquidity
(Cleary,1999).
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co-authors
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tern of variationin capital investments (Bedeian and Mossholder,
in capital
2000). Second,adjustments
investments
may not be entirely
planned;often,managersare forced
to cutbackor expandon thebasisof
marketdemandsand other condiin investtions.Therefore,
flexibility
mentsmayoccurnotonlybychoice,
butbycircumstance
as well.

riskand capitalinvestorganizational
ments,theypartwaysin theirassessments about performanceeffects.
researchers,
Strategic
usinga behavioral contingencyapproach, have
thattoremaincompetitive,
suggested
mustchangetheirreorganizations
sourcecommitments
in keepingwith
rapid changesin businessenvironments (Rindovaand Kotha, 2001;
Teece etal, 1997). In dynamicenvironments, established paradigms
Risk,Variationin Capital
about the sustainability
of competiInvestmentsand FirmPerformance
tiveadvantageand stable resource
Paststudieson riskand firmpercommitments
mayhave limiteduseformance
haveyieldedconflicting
reand flexibility
and adaptabilfulness,
sults.Althoughsome earlyfinancial itymaycontribute
moreto long-term
success. For firms experiencing
portfoliostudieshave shown that
risk
is
associated
with
in returns,
flexigreater
greater greateruncertainty
returns(Aakerand Jacobson,1987;
would enable
bilityin investments
Marshand Swanson,1984), others
themto maintaintheircompetitive
havequestionedthispositiveassociaadvantage,because outlaywouldbe
tion and have foundnegativerelaadjustedaccordingtoincomestream.
tionsbetweenfirmriskand returns If theenablingconditionsforstable
do notexist,firms
(Bowman, 1980, 1982; Bromiley, capitalinvestments
have
that adjust theirresourcecommit1991). The conflicting
findings
led researchers
to exploreand exmentsinresponsetoshifts
indemand
aminefactors
thatpotentially
in maintainimpact
maybe moresuccessful
the risk-returns
relationship.Bowing theircompetitive
advantagebeman (1982) lookedat factors
related
causethenewresourcecombinations
to specificmanagerialbehaviorin
could achievea betterfitwiththe
"troubledfirms"as wellas strategic changedbusinessconditions.
Thereinfirmreturns
is
skill,whileFiegen- fore,whenvariation
decision-making
baumand Thomas(1986) proposed
high,firmsthatrespondbyvarying
thatenvironmental
forcesplaya role.
their capital investments
are exThe risk-returns
howto
achieve
a
relationship,
pected
greaterlevelof
successthanarefirms
thatdo notadever,continuesto be one of theunresolved"black box" issues as no
behavjust theircapitalinvestments
consensushasemergedovertime.
iorpattern.
In viewoftheabovecontroversy,
a
However,the financialapproach
criticalquestionthatwe examineis
considersvariability
in capitalinvestwhetherfirmsthatvarytheircapital
mentsas undesirablebecauseof the
in responseto organiza- "diminishing
investments
to inmarginalreturns
tionalriskare moresuccessful
than
vestments,"
thoughonly"to theexthosethatdo not.Whereasthestra- tentthatoutputis a concavefunction
and financeperof investment"(Froot et al, 1993:
tegicmanagement
in
their
1630); in otherwords,outputgoes
spectivesconverge
predictionsabouttherelationship
between
down when capital investments
go
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down,leadingto lessoptimalreturns
incaseofvariations.
Frootand hiscoauthors(1993, 1994) acknowledge
that,inan uncertain
market,
changes
in businessconditionsmayalteror
Noneshiftthe functionaltogether.
theless,
apaccordingto thefinancial
is
proach,whenvariationin returns
firms
that
high,
respondbyvarying
theircapitalinvestments
willachieve
a lowerlevel of successthan those
thatemployanyotherorganizational
- variation
in capitalinvestments
risk
ofincombination
becausevariability
is detrimental
forreturns.
vestments
In factthefinancialperspective
recommendshedgingas a riskmanagementstrategy
to stabilizecapitalinvestments when cash flow is
uncertain.
Thesetwocompeting
viewson risk,
and
variationin capitalinvestments
are reflectedin
firmperformance,
alternate
thefollowing
hypotheses:

willbe affected
bytheorganizational
context.Firmsmaybe moreor less
able towithstand
theeffect
ofunceron thebasisof cerof returns
tainty
tain organizational
factors.We sugthat
gest
capitalintensity,
availability
and variability
in
of slackresources,
level of the firmwill
employment
moderatethe relationship
between
riskand capitalinvestments.
Capital
theoperating
levintensity
represents
and mayplaya sigerageofthefirm,
rolein determining
nificant
whether
or not capital investments
are affectedbyincome-stream
uncertainty.
A longstreamofresearchon organizationalslacksuggests
thattheinvestmentchoicesmadebymanagers
may
be enabledorconstrained
depending
on theavailability
of slackresources
withinthe organization(Steensma
and Corley,
2001).Similarly,
priorrein
searchindicatesthatinvestments
capitalassetsmaybe associatedwith
2a: Variationin capitalinvestchangesin humancapital(Caseio et
Hypothesis
moderate
therelationmentswillpositively
ai, 1997; Kallapurand Trombley,
riskand firm
shipbetweenorganizational
1999). Thereforewe examine the
performance.
effectof thesethreeormoderating
2b: Variationin capitalinvestHypothesis
ganizationalcontexts(capitalintentherelationmoderate
mentswillnegatively
of slack,and levelof
riskand firm
sity,availability
shipbetweenorganizational
on
beperformance.
employment) therelationship
riskand variatweenorganizational
in capitalinvestments.
bility
The OrganizationalContext
CapitalIntensity.
Capitalintensity,
or thelevelof physicalassets,repreResearchershave foundthatthe
contexthas a signifi- sentsthe operatingleverageof the
organizational
cant influenceon businessinvest- firm(Bartonand Gordon,1988)and
of fixedto
indicatesthe proportion
mentdecisions.Bower(1970) argues
variablecosts.Because capitalassets
are conthat capital investments
in
struc- are usuallyfixedand irreversible
strainedbythe organizational
dein place.Noda and
tureand systems
nature,greatercapitalintensity
noteshigherfixedcostsand resource
Bower (1996) show that resource
and morepressureon
commitment
processesare critically commitments
and struc- the cash flowof the firm.In many
influenced
bythestrategic
turalcontextsof the organization. capital-intensive
industries,the inlevelisnotonlyhighbutocvestment
it is likelythatthe relaTherefore,
risk
curs in a concentrated
manner,so
tionshipbetweenorganizational
and variationin capitalinvestments thatfirmsinvestin big projectsin
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goodyearsbutcutbackin leanyears
becauseoftheirhighfixedcosts.
Becausecapital-intensive
firmsare
characterized
byan emphasison the
capitalbudget,we suggestthatthey
are more likelyto be sensitiveto
andvariation
changesin firmreturns
in profitability.
We therefore
expect
thatthecapitalintensity
of thefirm
willfurther
accentuatethe effectof
firm
returns
on capitalinuncertainty
vestments
decisions.Firmsthathave
greaterlevelsofcapitalassetswillreact more to decreasedprofitability
becausetheyhavehigherfixedcosts,
whichmakes theircapital budgets
moresensitive
to changesin the income stream.Therefore,
firmswith
will cut back
high capitalintensity
moreon capitalinvestments
during
and invest
periodsoflowprofitability
moreduringprofit
upswings.
3: Greaterorganizational
riskis
Hypothesis
associatedwithgreater
variation
in capital
investments
whencapitalintensity
is high
thanwhenitis low.

Slack.An organizaOrganizational
tion'sexcessresources,
whichbuffer
the firmfromexternalshocksand
to as slack.Bechanges,are referred
havioraltheory
arguesthatslackprovidesa cushionthatenablesfirmsto
maintainstability
when faced with
performance
variability
(Cyertand
March,1963),whichindicatesa negativerelationship
betweenfirmreturnuncertainty
and organizational
slack.Empirically,
Bromiley(1991)
and Wisemanand Bromiley(1996)
find negativeassociationsbetween
variousmeasuresofslackand organizationalrisk;Palmerand Wiseman
(1999) finda negativerelationship
betweenslack and managerialrisktaking.
we expectthatorganAccordingly,
izationalslackwillbuffer
theeffect
of
riskon capitalinvestorganizational
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mentsdecisions.Firmswithhighlevelsofslackmaynotneed tovarytheir
decisionsas frecapitalinvestments
quentlyin responseto variationin
theirreturns
fortworeasons.First,
as
behavioral
predicted by
theory,
higherlevelsof slackmakethefirm
lesssensitive
tofluctuations
in theenvironment.
firmscan abTherefore,
sorb income streamuncertainty
to
some extentand showlessvariation
in theircapital investments
in rerisk.Second,
sponsetoorganizational
slackis inherently
morevariablethan
becauseitconsists
capitalinvestments
ofexcessresources
thatmaynothave
immediateuses,whereascapitalinvestments
referto long-term
capabilities(Maritan,
2001). Duringperiods
oflowandhighprofitability,
slackcan
moreeasilybe cutbackor added to
thancapitalassets,so a firmwould
varyitsslackassetsbeforeitscapital
investments.
Therefore,we expect
thatfirmswithmoreslackresources
willexhibitlessvariation
in capitalinvestments
in responseto organizationalrisk.
4: Greaterorganizational
riskis
Hypothesis
associatedwithgreatervariation
in capital
investments
whenslackis lowthanwhenit
is high.

in Employment
Scholars
Variability
havesuggestedthatinvestment
decisionsforphysicaland humanassets
are related.For example,Kallapur
and Trombley(1999) argue thata
firm'sinvestmentopportunity
set,
whichconsistsof theratioof capital
expenditureto assets,amongother
measures,depends on firm-specific
factorssuch as the physicaland human capitalin place. Caseio,Young,
and Morris(1997) demonstrate
that
firmsare moresuccessful
whenthey
make changesin theiremployment
alongwithchangesin theircapitalassets,and Koch and McGrath(1996)
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suggestthatfirmsoftenleveragelaborwithgreatercapitalassets.These
argumentspromptus to examine
therelationship
between
varwhether
in
andvariation
iationinfirmreturns
is
investments
affected
by
capital
levelsof
changesin theemployment
thefirm.
in employment
demonVariability
in adjuststratesthefirm'sflexibility
greater
ing itslevelof employment;
greaterfluctuavariability
represents
numbers
overtime,
tionsinemployee
relwhereaslesservariability
suggests
fixed
levels
of
employment
atively
(Gerhartand Trevor,1996). Firms
or contractual
emmayuse part-time
ployeesor resortto frequenthiring
andfiring
toadjusttheirlevelsofemin
tofluctuations
according
ployment
demandand supply.Financialliteratureon operatingleverageindicates
in capitalassetsare
thatinvestments
thanare inless
reversible
inherently
in people, whichimplies
vestments
thatcapitalis lessvariablethanlabor
(Dugan and Shriver,1992). Therefore,it maybe easierfora firmto
levelthanits
changeitsemployment
Accordlevelof capitalinvestments.
firms
that
with
we
expect
ingly,
will
variability
greateremployment
have less variationin capitalinvestmentsin responseto organizational
risk.
5: Greaterorganizationalriskis
Hypothesis
associated withgreatervariationin capital
in employment
whenvariability
investments
is low thanwhen it is high.

A modelwithall of our proposed
is shownin FigureI.
relationships
theinnotonlyhighlights
Thisfigure
butputsall our
dividualhypotheses,
in thesamecontogether
hypotheses
textualframework.
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIALISSUES

METHODS

We applied panel data analysis
techniques (Markus, 1979) on
time-se(firm),
pooledcross-sectional
ries (year)data fromStandardand
Poor's COMPUSTAT annual database for the period 1985-2002.We
chosethisperiodtorepresent
several
businesscycles,
so thatsporadicorocin an economic
casionalfluctuations
not
bias
the variability
would
cycle
patterns.All firmsincludedin the
sample satisfiedtwo criteria.First,
theyhave (a) positivevaluesforcapitalexpenditure,
(b) property,
plant,
and equipment,(c) totalassets,(d)
netsales,selling,and generaladministrative
expenses,(e) totaldebt,(f)
totalequity,(g) market
priceofstock
as of closingday,and (h) employee
numbers.
weremissSecond,no firms
ingtimeseriesdataforthechosenperiodon thesevariables.
Measures
OrganizationalRisk. We used two

ofreturns
measuresofuncertainty
one accounting
measure,variancein
thereturn
on equity(ROE), and one
market-based
measure,variancein
market
priceofstockas on thefinancial closingday.Earlierresearchhas
of firmprofitaused bothvariability
of stockpricesas
bilityand volatility
representingfirm risk (Bowman,
1980;Arend,2004).Returnon equity
incomebeis computedas operating
foreextraordinary
itemsdividedby
netequity.
Wecalculatedthevariance
in ROE and variancein market
price
ofstockoverthepreviousfiveyears.
For exampleforfirm1-1990observation,variancein ROE is over198589. Factorscoresof thesetwomeasureswereused to createan overall
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measureof risk(see Table 1) because
theyhave an advantageoverscales,in
that theyrepresentthe shared variance between factors (Miller and
Bromiley,1990).
Variance of anCapitalInvestments.
nual capital expenditure (CAPEX)
and annual value of property,plant,
and equipment (PPE) are twomeasures of variation in capital investments. Commonly used as a proxy
in fimeasureforcapital investments
nancial literature (Cleary, 1999),
CAPEX representsfundsused foradditionsto property,
plant,and equipment (excluding amounts from acquisitions) during a year. In turn,
PPE representsthe amountof capital
assetsheld bya firmeach yearand is
of
a proxyforthe capitalinvestments
the firmin prioryears.The variance
of CAPEX and PPE were calculated
over the previousfiveyears (i.e., the
firm1-1990varianceis over 1985-89).
We used factorscores of the twovariance measuresof capitalinvestments
to compute an aggregatemeasure of
variationin capital investments(see
Table 1).
Firm performFirm Performance.
ance was measured by averagingthe
returnon assets(ROA) and returnon
sales (ROS) overthecurrentyearand
last two years (e.g., 1987 firmperformanceis the average of 1985-87).
Averagingfirmperformanceover a
time period smoothes out fluctuations in performanceand ensures
thatthe overallperformancelevel is
reflected(Shen and Cannella, 2002).
We computedthefactorscoresof the
measures to obtain
two profitability
an aggregatemeasure for firmperformance,as seen in Table 1 (Miller
and Bromiley,1990).
and Control
OrganizationalContexts
Variables.Followingseveralpast studies, we used the ratio of property,
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIALISSUES

plant, and equipment to total assets
as the measure for capital intensity
(Barton, 1988). Scholars have proposed a number of measures of organizational slack, from which we
chose Bourgeois' (1981) conceptualizationofslackthroughdeliberateaction of managersbecause it fitswith
our researchemphasisof investment
behavior. Bourgeois (1981) noted
that an increase in general and administrative
expenses would indicate
management'sinjectionof slack into
the systemby their investmentin
more overhead items.Therefore,we
measuredslackas sellingand general
administrativeexpenses over sales
(Steensma and Corley, 2001), also
known as recoverableslack (Geiger
and Cashen, 2002). Variabilityof employment(Gerhartand Trevor,1996)
was measuredas the varianceof total
number of employees over the last
fiveyears.
Four controlvariablesare included
in our models. First,to account for
differencesin the capiindustry-level
behaviorof firms,we
tal investments
controlledforindustry,
usingthetwoindustrial
classification
standard
digit
(SIC). Second, because previousresearch has shown that firmsize is a
predictorof firmperformsignificant
ance and variationin stock returns
(Fama and French, 1992), we controlledforfirmsize, measuredas the
naturallogarithmofthetotalnumber
of employees averaged over time.
Third,we controlledforsales growth
for each year during the period of
our studybecause sales growthmay
have a significantimpact on the investment behavior of the firm.
Higher sales growth may prompt
managers to investin extra capacity
while lowersales mayinduce curtailmentofphysicalassets.Fourthand finally,we controlledfor debt-equity,
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theleverageratioof thefirm.Debtequityratioindicateshowtheinvest- a high ratio
mentsare financed
showsmoreborrowed
capital,whilea
moreequityfinanclowratiosignifies
ing.Eitherwayit mayhavelimiting
effectson investment
patterns.For
the caexample,highdebt restricts
to
borrow
while
more,
pacity
highequitymayleadtodilutionofequityand
lowerthe capacityto raise money
fromthemarkets.
weconTherefore,
trolledforitseffect.
Data and Analysis

Five initialyearsof data (19851989)werelostdue to calculationof
variance measures (i.e., variance
measureswereavailablefrom1990).
In addition,to includeappropriate
timelagsin thedata (in keepingwith
our argumentthatinvestment
decisionsand performance
effects
occur
witha lag), we laggedfirmperformancemeasuresbya yearinrelationto
in capitalinvestments
risk-variation
measures(i.e.,for1991firm
performin capital
ance,theriskand variation
investments
measure of 1990 was
the finaldataset
taken).Therefore,
consistedof 1,284firms,each with
twelveyearsof data (1991-2002),reobservasultingin 15,408firm-year
tions.Forty-seven
industries
at twoin
digitSIC levelwere represented
the data. These includeprimary
industries(SIC 10, 13, 14, 16), manu(SIC 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26,
facturing
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
and utilities
38, 39), transportation
(SIC 42,48,49), trade,retail,and automotive
dealers(50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
55,56,57,58,59), banking,
financial,
and realestate(61, 62, 65, 67), services(70,73,76,78,79),andpublicadministration
and miscellaneous
(SIC
80,87,99).
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIALISSUES

We used the SAS procedure
TSCSREG (time-series,
cross-section
regression),which analyzes panel
datasetsthatconsistofmultiple
timeseriesobservations
on each ofseveral
cross-sectional
units (firmsin this
case). This procedurerequiresthat
each firmhas the same numberof
time-series
observations.
Since ordileast
estimates
of panel
nary
squares
data can resultin biased estimates
due to thenon-independence
of errorswithincross-sections,
thisprocedureemploys
Hausman'stestforrandom effects with autoregressive
and provides
least
errors,
generalized
squares estimates.For testingthe
the productsof
effects,
moderating
thestandardized
variableswereused
as interaction
terms(Cohenand Cohen,1983) in PROC TSCSREG.
RESULTS

The resultsof our analysisare
shownin Tables2 and 3. The correlations,means,and standarddeviationsare in Table 2. Aswe expected,
the measuresof organizational
risk
are positivelycorrelatedwith the
measuresof variationin capitalinvestments.
1, whichposHypothesis
tulatesa positiverelationshipbetween organizational risk and
variationin capital investments,
is
supported(see Table 3). The coefficientestimateof overallriskis positiveand significant
forvariationin
coefcapitalinvestments
(regression
ficient= .04, p < .05), and the rsquareforthemodelis .17.
Hypotheses2a and 2b postulate
twocompeting
viewsregarding
theef- variationin capital
fectof the risk
investments
relationshipon longtermfirmperformance.
wefind
First,
thatorganizational
riskis negatively
relatedto firmperformance
(regres-
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= -.03,p < .05), consioncoefficient
sistent
withtheeffects
thatMillerand
(1990)found(see Table3).
Bromiley
variationin capitalinvestSimilarly,

(j

mentsis negatively
relatedto firm
performance
(regressioncoefficient
= -.10,p < .001). The interaction
betweenriskand variation
in capitalin-
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and positive
vestments
is significant
coefficient
.=
.09, p <
(regression
and the
.001) forfirmperformance,
forthemodelis .08.Because
r-square
are consistent
with
our maineffects
that
our
we
believe
research,
previous
datapartially
2a.
supportHypothesis
a pos3,whichpredicts
Hypothesis
effectof capitalinitivemoderating
on
the
between
relationship
tensity
riskand variationin
organizational
is supported(see
capitalinvestments,
oftheinterTable3) . The coefficient
is
actionof riskand capitalintensity
and
(regression
significant
positive
= .02,p < .05). Hypothecoefficient
sis4, whichpredictsa negativemodslack
of organizational
eratingeffect
in capitalinveston theriskvariation
mentsrelationship,
also is supported
of the
(see Table 3) . The coefficient
of riskand slackis negainteraction
coeftiveand significant
(regression
ficient= -.03,p < .01). Hypothesis
5,
in emwhichassertsthatvariability
moderatesthe
ploymentnegatively
variationin
between
relationship
and variationin capital
profitability
is supported(see Table
investments,
The
results
showthatdie regres3).
of the interaction
sion coefficient
in employtermbetweenvariability
riskis negmentand organizational
ativeand significant
(-.02,p < .05).
We followedthe procedureoutlined byAikenand West (1991) to
graphically interpret interaction
termsin Hypotheses
2a, 2b,3, 4, and
5. We plottedtwolinesforeach ineffect:
one forhighand the
teraction
otherforlowlevelsofthemoderator
variable.The high and low values
(mean ± standarddeviation)of the
wereplotvariable(y-axis)
dependent
tedagainsthighandlowvaluesofthe
independentvariable(x-axis).The
of theredirectionand intersection
sultinglinesare shownin FiguresII,

75

is
III, IV, and V. Firmperformance
when
firms
show
high
high-risk
greatervariationin capital investments(FigureII) . Thisindicatesthat
firms
thatfacehighriskand can vary
theircapital investments
are more
in capitalinvestsuccessful.
Variation
mentsis highwhenbothcapitalintensityand organizationalrisk are
high (FigureIII). Therefore,
capital
hasa positive
efintensity
moderating
fecton therisk-variation
in a capital
in
investments
Variation
relationship.
is
when
slack
investments
capital
high
is lowand organizational
riskis high
(FigureIV), whichindicatesa negativemoderatingeffectof slack. Fiin capitalinvestments
nally,variation
in employis high whenvariability
riskis
mentis lowand organizational
high (FigureV), whichindicatesa
effectof varianegativemoderating
in
on the organibility employment
- capitalinvestments
rezationalrisk
lationship.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Research Implications

Westudiedtherelationship
among
in capirisk,variation
organizational
tal investments,
and firmperformance using competingperspectives
fromstrategicmanagementand fiwithbothstrategic
nance.Consistent
and financialmanagemanagement
withgreater
ment,we findthatfirms
risk
are
associated
organizational
in capitalinwithgreatervariations
On theotherhand,these
vestments.
outtwoliteratures
predictdifferent
effects
of
comesforthe interaction
- variationin
the organizational
risk
capital investments
relationshipon
firmperformance.
The contingency
in strategic
dynamicfitperspective
thatfirmsthat
management
suggests

JOURNAL OF MANAGERIALISSUES

Vol. XVIII Number 1 Spring2006

Bhattacharya and Wheatley

76

FigureII
Risk
ModeratingEffectofVariationin Capital Investments-Organizational
on FirmPerformance
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FigureIV
ModeratingEffectof OrganizationalRisk-Slack
on Variabilityin Capital Investments
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make adjustmentsto their investmentsin responseto incomestream
in
willbe moreprofitable
uncertainty
thelongrun(Cyert
and March,1963;
Rindovaand Kotha,2001; Thompson, 1967). However,in thefinance
Frootet al (1993, 1994)
literature,
suggestthatfirmsshouldaim to stabilize theirinvestment
patternsfor
returns.
greater
wetestedtwocompetAccordingly,
fortheinteraction
efinghypotheses
in capitalinvestfectofrisk-variation
ments on firmperformance:
one
thatcontinuous
to
stating
adjustment
in responseto incapitalinvestments
comestreamuncertainty
wouldinfluence firmperformance
in a positive
manner,theotherjust theopposite.
Consistent
withthestrategic
managementperspective,
our resultsshow
that high organizational
riskfirms
withhighervariationin capitalinvestments
low-risk
firms
outperform
withhighvariationin capitalinvestfirmswith
ments,and thatlow-risk
in capitalinvestments
lowervariation
firms
withlower
outperform
high-risk
variationin capitalinvestments.
We
havefaithinthisfinding,
becauseour
maineffects
behaveina mannerakin
to theeffects
foundin otherstudies
that examinesimilarrelationships.
Therefore,our findingslend more
fitapcredenceto the contingency
proach in strategicmanagement
- highvariation
thehighrisk
in cap- low
ital investments
and low risk
in capitalinvestments
comvariation
binationsseem to generatehigher
in contrast
to
levelsofperformance,
- lowvariations
in capithehighrisk
- highvartalinvestments
or lowrisk
iationin capitalinvestments.
We also find that the organizationalcontextsof capitalintensity,
slack,and variationin employment
moderatethe relationship
between
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIALISSUES

variationin profitability
and capital
thatfirms
investments.
Byindicating
with greatercapital intensityand
in
greaterriskhavegreatervariation
theircapital investments
decisions,
theresultsreaffirm
theassertion
that
firms,which have
capital-intensive
greater operational leverage, are
moresensitive
torisk(Lev,1974;Miller and Bromiley,
1990). Firmswith
moreorganizational
slackexhibitless
variation
in capitalinvestments
in reto
consistent
bewith
the
sponse risk,
havioral theory prediction that
greaterslackenablesfirmsto absorb
greater risks (Cyert and March,
wefindthatfirms
that
1963).Finally,
exhibitgreatervariability
in employmentrespondlessto riskin relation
to capitalinvestments.
This finding
supportsour positionthatcapitalinare inherently
vestments
lessflexible
thanis employment
and, therefore,
firms
thatrespondtogreater
riskwith
in employment
exgreatervariability
hibitless variationin capitalinvestments.The resultsalso show that
firms
withgreaterincomestreamunand thosethatmakemore
certainty
in
makefewer
changes employment
changesin theircapitalassets.
ManagerialImplications

Froma practitioner's
pointofview,
our findings
haveseveralsignificant
First,managersshould
implications.
be awarethatthe levelof organizationalriskdetermines
thevariability
in capitalexpenditures.
Therefore,
riskclosely.Sectheyshouldmonitor
in capital
ond,becauselowvariation
in combination
investments
withlow
riskand highvariation
organizational
incapitalinvestments
incombination
withhighorganizational
riskoutperformothercombinations
ofrisk-variationin capitalinvestments,
manag-
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ers in low-risksituationsshould
consider strategiesfor stabilizing
whilethose
theircapitalinvestments,
firms
shouldbe readyto
in high-risk
This
varytheircapitalexpenditure.
of
that
keyfinding
suggests managers
firmsmustunderstandthe
low-risk
ofstabilizing
theircapital
importance
and decideon strategies
investments
fordoingso. Forexample,theymay
use financialhedgingtoolslike options for theircapital investments
(e.g.,oil companiesoftenlease their
drillingsitesinsteadof buyingthem
in orderto stabilizeinvestoutright
mentsover a long period and not
itin anyone period). In constagger
trast,managersof high-risk
organibetterwhen
zationsseemto perform
enoughtovarytheir
theyareflexible
Clearly,thisencapitalinvestments.
for
tailsa different
set of strategies
theircapitalinvestments
processes.
Forexample,theyshouldinvestheavand cutback
ilyduringrisingreturns
downturns.
during
Finally,the moderatingcontext
variables
guidance
providesignificant
in capitalinformanaging
variability
vestments.
Managersshould thereto theseorforepayclose attention
beforedeciding
contexts
ganizational
theirstrategy.
We findthatin capital
in capiintensive
firms
thevariability
in responseto organtalinvestments
izationalriskis accentuated.This is
firms
butmaycregood forhigh-risk
firms.
In eiate problems
forlow-risk
thercase,managersshouldfactorin
in their
theeffect
ofcapitalintensity
On
forcapitalinvestments.
strategy
theotherhand,ourresults
showthat
in emslackresources
and variability
buffer
theeffect
ofriskon
ployment
incapitalinvestments.
This
variability
firms
to
their
low-risk
stabilize
helps
so these
capitalinvestments
pattern,
firmsshouldadopt strategies
to in-
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crease slackand employment
variaFor
retail
the
indusbility. example,
ofreturns
is low
wherevariability
try,
(comparedto say,computermanufacturers),primarilyuses employmentvariability
to adjustto seasonal
in cash flow;theyrestrucvariations
ture capitalinvestments
onlywhen
thereis a need formajor strategic
firm
changes.However,a high-risk
withhighslackand employment
variabilitymaysee somewhatreduced
effects
ofrisk-variability
performance
in capital investments
interaction.
firm(e.g.,
Forexample,a technology
computerhardwaremanufacturer)
wouldhavea cyclicalpatternofcapitalinvestments
inkeepingwiththecyclicalreturns.
Limitationsand Scope forFuture
Research

It is appropriate
hereto pointout
some limitations
of our studythat
shouldbe addressedthroughfuture
research. First, methodologically,
capital expenditures,the value of
and equipment,
and
plant,property,
capitalexpendituresover sales are
broadapproximations
of the capital
investments
decisionsofa firm.This
is a shortcoming
of accountingdata
in itself,
becausesuchdata,due toagand otheradjustments,
ingregation
losesomeoftheirrichness.
A
evitably
morefine-grained
analysisof differenttypesofcapitalexpenditures
may
providea betterpictureofhowcapital investments
decisionsvaryover
time.Forexample,maintenance
and
be
replacement
expensesmay disaggregatedfromexpensesfornewcapitalassets.Internalfirmdataor other
secondarysourcesmayrevealwhat
ofcapitalexpenditures
is
percentage
on
investments
as
to
spent
opposed
routinemaintenance,
replacements,
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Limitations
or additions.Furthermore,
aside,thisstudyis the
qualitain theriskliterature
to explicitly
first
tive or surveydata may indicate
whethermanagersintentionally
vary
investigatethe organizationalriskrelavariationin capitalinvestments
decisionsin recapitalinvestments
a
lonat
the
firm-level
from
extent
that
to
to
risk
what
is,
tionship
sponse
is
in capitalinvestments
thevariation
Although,in
gitudinalperspective.
firms
resort
to
intendedor forced.
adjustments
practice,
Second,we focuson twodimen- incapitalbudgetsinviewofuncertain
no
and marketreturns,
risk- varia- profitability
sionsof organizational
tionin returnson equityand varia- studyhas analyzedthisrelationship.
Maritan(2001) studiedthecapitalintions in market price of stock.
vestments
and
Rau
Miller,
(2001)
decision-making
processin
Bromiley,
associated
relation
to
the
the
differnice
of
a
uncertainty
summary
provide
and repwithan investment
enttypesofriskconstructs,
project,but the
licatingthis studyusing alternate level of analysiswas individualprofocuson thepatof risk,likeperceptual jects.We explicitly
specifications
investments
behavior
tern
of
risk,and managerial
(Palcapital
risk-taking
in capitalinin theformofvariation
mer and Wiseman,1999), mayenIn
whichhas not been exof our findings.
hancethevalidity
vestments,
shouldalsoexresearchers
thefuture,
plored previously.Therefore,our
varcontext
studyopensup a newresearcharea
ploremoreorganizational
literatherisk-variation forthe strategic
iablesthatmayaffect
management
ture.
For
incapitalinvestments
relationship.
- such
Our studyalso expandsresearch
humancapitalfactors
example,
riskby investigatas managerial
experi- on organizational
demographics,
variablefor
ence,risk-taking
(i.e.,how
ing it as an explanatory
propensity
decisions
and
investment
to
strategic
managersrespond risk) (Palmer
that
it
is
a
and Wiseman,1999), a firm'scomsignificant
predicshowing
in capitalinvestments
petitiveposition,and othercontex- torofvariation
decitualvariablessuggested
(a majorresource-commitment
byCyertand
. Followingthe traMarch (1963)- such as aspiration sion of thefirm)
ditionof Bowman(1980, 1982) and
levelsofmanagers
and expectation
we showthatthe
otherresearchers,
this
affect
relationship.
may
risk-firm
Third, an interestingresearch organizational
performance
relationshipcan be betterunderquestionthatarisesfromourstudyis:
ofthe
thecontext
bestoodbyexamining
industries
do firmsin different
in theircapitalinhave differently
firm,in thatwe find thatlow-risk
firmsthatvarytheircapitalinvestdecisionsin responseto
vestments
mentsare outperformed
efrisk?
Wehaveassumedan industry
byhigh-risk
firmsthatvarytheircapitalinvestfectand have controlledfor it bethe revelations
ments.Additionally,
cause thefocusof our studyis more
effects
ofthree
aboutthemoderating
in capital
on theoverallrisk-variation
variables
contextual
investments
capital intenrelationship.However,
in employas well as intra-in- sity,slack,and variability
an inter-industry
on
the riskmore
ment
shed
throw
additional
light
analysismay
dustry
behavioroffirms.
capitalinvestments
lighton thisrelationship.
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